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FOREWORD

PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE:
A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS RESOLVED
JOHN

H.

ROBINSON*

My thesis here is that no decision of the United States
Supreme Court during the past quarter century is as important as
its decision in Washington v. Glucksberg.1 In that decision the
Supreme Court succeeded, contentiously and temporarily, in
limiting the harm that can be done to federalism and to democracy by way of a substantive reading of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.2 I believe that
at the outset of an issue of the Notre DameJournal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy that is devoted to questions related to the beginning
and end of life, we should pause to consider both the importance
of this accomplishment and its fragility.
For just over a century now, American constitutional law has
been bedeviled by judicial readings of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment that make that clause something
more than a guarantee of the sort of procedure that ought to be
employed to determine whether or not a particular person
should be deprived of his or her life, liberty, or property by way
of governmental action. Once upon a truly dreadful time, that
*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. The litigation

history that appears on pages 8-11 of this foreword also appeared in a foreword
that I wrote for an earlier symposium. SeeJohn H. Robinson, PhysicianAssisted
Suicide: Its Challenge to the Prevailing ConstitutionalParadigm, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 345, 355-58 (1995).
1. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
2. One provision of the Fourteenth Amendment says that no state
"shall ...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Almost identical language appears in the
Fifth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The provisions of that
amendment considered solely as such, limit only the power of the federal
government. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
While the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is susceptible to a
substantive reading, see, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), my
focus here is on substantive readings of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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sort of reading of the Due Process Clause entailed the judicial
invalidation of state efforts to regulate labor relations. For the
past sixty years and more, that entailment has been abandoned,
but for the past thirty-eight years, the federal courts have been
grappling with substantive readings of the Due Process Clause
that address a liberty vastly more intimate than the freedom to
sell one's labor for less than a living wage or for more hours than
one's health can stand. That liberty is, of course, freedom from
intrusive governmental regulation of sexual relations. The Justices who presided over the revival of substantive due process
adjudication were all keenly aware of its earlier and cataclysmic
career as a monitor of labor-relations laws, and they took pains to
protect it from a similar fate in its second career. Back in 1961,
when the second Justice Harlan first announced the revival of
this approach to constitutional adjudication, he was careful to
specify just how it was to be implemented. Substantive due process adjudication, he said, requires the courts to strike a balance
between "postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual"
and "the demands of organized society."4 That balance, in turn,
is to be struck with an eye to "to the traditions from which [this
country] developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke."5 Substantive due process adjudication, as Justice Harlan
envisioned it, would, therefore, pursue a conservative agenda,
invalidating only those laws that strayed too far from those traditions. Decisions predicated upon abuse of the substantive due
process prerogative "could not long survive," 6 justice Harlan said,
while those that were built on the living tradition that he had in
mind were, as he put it, "likely to be sound."7
Two things need to be said aboutJustice Harlan's attempted
resurrection of substantive due process: first, that it failed to win
over his brethren on the Supreme Court; and second, that when,
after his demise, the Court did accept substantive due process
thinking, it accepted a markedly less conservative version of it.
3.

See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)

(invalidating a Kansas

law prohibiting the use of "yellow-dog contracts," or contracts where an
employee agreed not to join a union while employed); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New York statute prescribing the maximum
hours allowed to be worked by bakers); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897) (invalidating a Louisiana statute prohibiting state citizens from dealing
with marine insurance companies that had not fully complied with Louisiana
law).
4.
5.
6.
7.

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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By the time the Court decided Roe v. Wad in 1973, Harlan's use
of substantive due process adjudication to rein in legislative deviations from our tradition of respect for individual liberty had
given way to a vastly more venturesome use of it. As an analytic
matter, this was achieved by complementing Justice Harlan's tradition test with one that asked if a particular practice was
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."9 If it was, then it was
entitled to protection from intrusive state legislation. As the
assisted suicide cases will reveal, this "ordered liberty" test sets the
judiciary free, in ways the tradition test does not, to invalidate
legislation that interferes with those practices that members of
the judicial elite value highly, even when no constitutional text
warrants that invalidation. Pursuant to this latter day account of
substantive due process, the federal judiciary, lead by the
Supreme Court, was to assume a leadership role in liberating the
states from those limitations on human freedom that judicial discernment finds to be outmoded or arbitrary.
That the federal judiciary should lead the struggle for freedom and that legislatures should be sources of oppression may
perhaps have made sense at a time when the federal judiciary
had just spent a generation liberating blacks from the oppressive
laws passed by the legislatures of the southern states, but it would
surely have seemed odd to an earlier generation that had seen
the federal judiciary frustrate legislative efforts to guarantee
working men and women decent working conditions and a living
wage. Whether or not the judiciary is progressive or retrogressive-and whether or not our own judgments on that issue turn
out to be correct-substantive due process adjudication, more
than any other sort of adjudication, puts both the federal judiciary and the democratic process at risk in two extremely troublesome ways. First, substantive due process adjudication imperils
the legitimacy of the judiciary by inviting what may be called conscientious defiance of its commands1 0 Where a court can point
to a particular constitutional text as a warrant for its orders, and
where it can summon up generations of case law that bear upon
that text in support of its orders, there the possibility of conscientious defiance is limited. But where a court has nothing but the
sparse language of the Due Process Clause to give as a warrant
for its commands, and where no other currently effective clause
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. The phrase comes from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
10. For evidence that some think that this invitation ought to be accepted
in the current era, see generally Symposium, The End of Democracy? The Judicial
Usurpation of Politics, FiRST THINGS, Nov. 1996.
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of the Constitution has nearly so checkered a history as the Due
Process Clause, there the conscientious citizen who believes that
the judiciary has taken sides in a partisan political struggle is
sorely tempted to resent its intrusion into the political process
and to hold its commands in contempt. This is not good for
either the judiciary or the political process.
The second way in which substantive due process adjudication puts both the judiciary and the democratic process at risk is
by its tendency to trivialize the legislative process by arrogating to
itself the last word on hotly contested issues. When this happens
legislators, and the people whom they represent, are made to
look infantile and inept, able perhaps to allocate funds for
bridges and highways, but unable to resolve any question of any
great significance. Worse yet, judges are made to look wise, as if
with their robes they also put on a kind of wisdom that allows
them to resolve all of the really hard questions for us. As
Thayer" and Frankfurter, 12 not to mention Holmes 3 and Brandeis,1 4 knew, judges do not put on any such wisdom with their
robes and legislators need not be as inept as the judiciary sometimes thinks, and in any case this entire picture makes a mockery
of the democratic process.
What we need, then, is a form of substantive due process
adjudication in which this tendency to trivialize the legislature
and to convince the judiciary of its superior wisdom is kept to a
minimum. What we have gotten from our judiciary in recent
years has not quite filled that bill, and it is fairly easy to explain
11. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1883). For a symposium on Thayer's
work in this area, see Symposium, One Hundred Years of Judicial Review: The
Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1993).
12. See H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 128-137 (1981).
See also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-71 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) and Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586, 600 (1940) ("To fight out the wise use of legislative authority in the forum
of public opinion and before legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such
a contest to the judicial arena, serves to vindicate the self-confidence of a free

people.").
13. See David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of JudicialRestraint,
44 DuKE L.J. 449 (1994). See also Justice Holmes' dissents in Tyson &
Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-47 (1927)
and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 567-71 (1923).
14. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 285 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The legislature, being familiar with local conditions,
is, primarily, the judge of the necessity of such enactments. The mere fact that
a court may differ with the legislature in its views of public policy, or that judges
may hold views inconsistent with the propriety of the legislation in question,
affords no grounds for judicial interference.").
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why that should be. Whenever the appropriateness of substantive due process adjudication is an issue in an actual case, there is
always a second, equally pressing issue before the court in question. That issue is, of course, the putative right whose violation
has given rise to the litigation in the first place. That issuebirth control, abortion, gay rights, suicide-is certain to engage
our minds and to fire our passions, and we can forgive ourselves
for being more intent upon having that issue resolved as we
believe it should be than we are upon the vastly drier issue of
who should resolve it. It is, however, that drier issue that is raised
when the propriety of substantive due process adjudication is
discussed.
In Bowers v. Hardwick,1 5 for example, Justice Blackmun, in
dissent, wrote a moving plea for including gay rights within the
ambit of Griswold and its progeny.1 6 Were it clear that substantive
due process adjudication of the sort employed in Roe v. Wade is
appropriate in a government constituted as ours is, Blackmun's
dissent may well have deserved to carry the day. When, on the
other hand, Justice White attempted in the opinion of the Court
to distinguish gay sex from straight sexual intimacies, his effort
was half-hearted and his results were unpersuasive. 7 When, however, he addressed the legitimacy of the entire enterprise of substantive due process adjudication, there he made claims that
Justice Blackmun left unaddressed. After dismissing the case for
the inclusion of gay sex among those intimacies that, by virtue of
the Due Process Clause, merit judicial protection from intrusive
legislation as "at best, facetious," Justice White goes on to say:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our
authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in
the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judgemade constitutional law having little or no cognizable toots
in the language or design of the Constitution. That this is
so was painfully demonstrated by the face-off between the
Executive and the Court in the 1930's, which resulted in
the repudiation of much of the substantive gloss that the
15.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).

16. See id. at 199-214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a state law that criminalized the
use of contraceptives even by married persons in their marital relations);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a state law that prohibited
the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (invalidating state laws that prohibited abortion except for the
purpose of saving the pregnant woman's life).
17. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-191.
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Court had placed on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of
those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the
Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority.1 8
When Roe v. Wade was challenged in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,19 the survivors of the Bowers majority found themselves in
dissent, and there they repeated the concerns about legitimacy
that Justice White had expressed in Bowers. The Casey majority,
successors to the normative commitments of the Bowers dissent,
this time had a response to Justice White's legitimacy concerns.
Likening the opposition that Roe has engendered to that sparked
by Brown v. Board of Education,2 ° and likening its refusal to reverse
Roe to the Court's earlier refusal to retreat from Brown, the Casey
majority said that legitimacy concerns require courts to stand by
hotly contested outcomes until the court in question receives
"the most convincing justification"2 1 for rejecting them.
In two respects, the majority's attempt in Casey to analogize
Roe to Brown falls short. Consider first the rhetorical effect of
analogizing Roe to Brown, in particular the probability that the
analogy will lead critics of Roe to see it as really very much like
Brown and for that reason to have been correctly decided. Some
people, to be sure, have long seen Roe as just like Brown inasmuch
as the right to have an abortion free from restrictive state regulation liberates women in their private and business lives just as
Brown liberated African-Americans from second class status in
their business and political lives. Others, however, have seen Roe
as the polar opposite to Brown and as like the hated Dred Scott
decision of one hundred forty years ago inasmuch as both Roe
and Dred Scott said of a class of human beings that they are not
persons, consigning previable fetuses to death and antebellum
blacks to slavery.2 2 When the Court analogizes Roe to Brown it
takes sides in the intense political dispute over abortion, thereby
depriving its effort at legitimizing its Roe jurisprudence of the
rhetorical effect for which the Court was hoping.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 194-95.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 836.
The conflict between the two understandings of abortion alluded to

here is nicely sketched in
MOTHERHOOD (1984).

KRISTIN LuKER,

ABORTION AND

THE POLITICS

OF
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As an analytic matter, for the Casey Court's analogy of Roe to
Brown to succeed as part of an overall effort to legitimize Roe
itself and expansive substantive due process adjudication generally, the points of analogy between Roe and Brown would have to
outweigh the points of disanalogy. To say that because both decisions were in their own day controversial is perhaps to suggest
one point of analogy, but then Dred Scott was controversial in its
day2" as were the earlier substantive due process decisions in
theirs.2 4 Why then analogize Roe to Brown and not to Dred Scott?
A consideration of what is missing from the Roe jurisprudence
that was demonstrably present in the Brown jurisprudence suggests how difficult it would be for the Casey majority to answer
that question. What was missing from the Casey Court's effort to
legitimize Roe by analogy to Brown was any attention to the presence of an explicit textual warrant for Brown25 and its absence in
the case of Roe, any attention to the presence of a compelling
moral critique of racism" and the countervailing difficulty of
articulating such a critique of laws making abortion illegal, any
attention to the breakdown of the legislative process with regard
to racist state legislation in the fifties and the absence of a similar
breakdown with respect to abortion law reform in the seventies,
or any attention to the political consensus on the evils of segregation that had taken shape outside of the South in the post-war
years and the absence of a similar consensus on the abortion
question at the time that Roe was decided. What the Casey majority left unaddressed, in other words, was the legitimacy of substantive due process adjudication itself.
As a result, when the American judiciary took up the issue of
assisted suicide, it had to work from a schizoid account of substantive due process adjudication: that form of adjudication was
simultaneously a constitutionally compelled attempt "to define
23. Abraham Lincoln, for one, repeatedly attacked the Dred Scott
decision. See, for example, his Speech at Springfield, Illinois, ofJune 26, 1857,
in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINcoLN 398 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds.,
1953). See also his First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois, on
Aug. 21, 1858, in 3 id. at 1, and his First Inaugural Address, on Mar. 4, 1861, in 4
id. at 262.

24. The locus classicus for the rejection of the early substantive due
process decisions is Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
See also Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight Hour Day, 21 HARv. L.
REv. 495 (1908).
25. "[No state shall] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
26. See GUNNAR MvRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM
AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (20th anniv. ed. 1962).
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the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's own promise"
and a prudentially forbidden exercise in judicial delegitimation.
A quick survey of three cases that preceded the Supreme Court's
own attempt to put both assisted suicide and substantive due process in their proper constitutional place will reveal the consequences of that schizoid status and lay the groundwork for the
Court's resolution of it.
In December of 1993, Richard C. Kaufman, a trial court
judge in Michigan, determined that the constitutional law of
decisional privacy includes, in some circumstances at least, a
right to commit suicide.2 8 Predictably, Judge Kaufman reached
his conclusion by asking himself if suicide has either the historical or the conceptual warrant required by decisional privacy
law.2 9 Finding the historical inquiry to produce a "murky"
result," he turned to the conceptual issue-viz.-"whether the
right to commit suicide is ever part of the implicit concept of
ordered liberty."3 1 In this inquiry, the good judge was guided by
the assertion of the plurality in the then-recent Casey decision to
the effect that "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life" lies at the heart of the liberty that the Fourteenth Amend32
ment protects against intrusive governmental regulation.
Using this assertion as his guide, Judge Kaufman was easily able
to conclude that suicide decisions deserve to be added to sexual
decisions as among the sorts of decisions implicated in this concept of ordered liberty.3 3 All that was left for him to do was to
decide that, in some cases at least, the state's countervailing
interest in proscribing suicide fail to trump a particular person's
right to die,34 and the trial judge was free to invalidate Michigan's prohibition on assisted suicide, at least as that prohibition
applied to the case then before his court. 35 For our later purposes, it is important to note how much adjudicative freedom
Judge Kaufman found in the "ordered liberty" half of the sub-

27. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
28. See People v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 13, 1993), rev'd. sub nom. Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994), affd in part, rev'd. in part sub nom. People v. Kevorkian,
527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082 (1995).
29. See Kevorkian, 1993 WL 603212, at *8.
30. See id. at *13.
31.

Id.

32.

Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
See id. at *18.
See id. at *19.
See id. at *20.

33.
34.
35.
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stantive due process test. We will return to that theme when we
discuss Compassion in Dying a paragraph or two hence.
One year later, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the
decision that I have just sketched. 6 Speaking for a majority of
his court on this point, Justice Cavanagh found the historical
inquiry mandated by the decisional privacy cases to be far from
murky. He found instead a long and clear history of societal and
legal disapproval of suicide, a history that includes the criminalization of assisted suicide by sixty percent of the states that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.' 7 As for the claim that a right
to suicide is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, Justice
Cavanagh argued both that the argument for that claim was
internally incoherent and that by proving too much it proved
nothing at all. 3" The incoherence, Justice Cavanagh thought, lay
in the conflict between the dignitarian presuppositions of all
autonomy-based claims and the violation of human dignity
implicit in any effort to measure the value of a person's life by
reference to the current state of that person's mind or body.3 9
The tendency of the argument to prove too much, and therefore
to prove nothing, stems from its linkage of a suicide right to
autonomy; if the argument works, Justice Cavanagh thought,
then every autonomous person would have a rebuttable right to
suicide, but this, he thought, is a conclusion that even the advocates of a suicide right are at pains to reject.4" Justice Cavanagh
dismissed as unpersuasive the efforts of the dissenters to employ
a balancing test to determine the class of persons whose interest
in a painless and prompt death outweighs the countervailing
interests that ordinarily militate in favor of a prohibition on one
person's giving another assistance in dying.'"
While this constitutional drama was being played out in
Michigan, a parallel phenomenon was occurring on the West
Coast. In May of 1994, Barbara Rothstein, the ChiefJudge of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, in deciding Compassion in Dying v. Washington,42 found in the
Due Process Clause, as it has been interpreted by the decisional
privacy cases, a constitutional right whereby "adults who are mentally competent, terminally ill, and acting under no undue influence" are entitled "to voluntarily hasten their death by taking a
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994).
See id. at 730-33.
See id. at 727 n. 41.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 727 n.37.
850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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lethal dose of physician-prescribed medicine."43 As had Judge
Kaufman in Michigan five months earlier, Judge Rothstein predicated this finding on the Casey majority's claim that "the right to
define one's own concept or existence, or meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life" lies at the heart of the
liberty that the Fourteenth Amendment protects from intrusive
governmental regulation.4 4 By way of this understanding of the
scope of the Due Process Clause, Judge Rothstein was able to
analogize suicide decisions to abortion decisions inasmuch as
each involves "the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime."4" With that much done, all Judge Rothstein had to do was to deny the constitutional significance of the
distinction between the termination of life-sustaining medical
treatment and the prescription of a lethal dose of medication,
and she was free to declare Washington's law against assisted suicide unconstitutional.4 6
By further analogy to the Michigan litigation, when a three
judge panel of the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal from Judge
Rothstein's decision, that panel reversed her decision.4 7 There
.Judge John Noonan, speaking for the two-to-one majority,
rejected Judge Rothstein's attempt to use the "mystery of human
life" quote from the Casey plurality as a bridge between the constitutional regulation of abortion laws and the constitutional regulation of assisted suicide laws. As had the Michigan Supreme
Court, the panel majority found any effort to base a suicide right
in a more general autonomy claim to prove too much, and hence
to prove nothing. As Judge Noonan said:
If at the heart of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment is this uncurtailable ability to believe and to
act on one's deepest beliefs about life, the right to suicide
and the right to assistance in suicide are the prerogative of
at least every sane adult. The attempt to restrict such rights
to the terminally ill is illusory. If such liberty exists in this
context, as Casey asserted in the context of reproductive
rights, every man and woman in the United States must
enjoy it .... The conclusion is a reductio ad absurdum.4 s
The panel also rejected as out of hand Judge Rothstein's
efforts to deny the constitutional significance of the distinction
43.
44.
(1992).
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1456.
Id. at 1459 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
Id. at 1462.
See id. at 1467.
See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 591.
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between refusing life support and seeking medical help in
dying.4 9 Having done this, the panel majority found it easy to
conclude that neither the language of the Constitution nor the
history of its interpretation entail a constitutional right of the
sort thatJudge Rothstein had so confidently asserted ten months
earlier.5 °
Judge Noonan's panel decision suffered much the same fate
in the hands of the Ninth Circuit banc that reviewed it as Judge
Rothstein's decision had in his hands. In a decision written by
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, the banc rejected the panel's decision
and affirmed the district court at least insofar as that court had
based its invalidation of Washington's prohibition of assisted suicide on due process grounds. 1 Finding that "the essence of the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause is to limit the
ability of the state to intrude into the most important matters of
our lives, at least without substantial justification, '52 and finding
that the decisions about the time and manner of one's death is
one of those matters, Judge Reinhardt had no difficulty concluding that "the constitution encompasses a due process liberty
interest in controlling the time and manner of one's death-that
53
there is, in short, a constitutionally recognized 'right to die.'
When he considered the state's countervailing interests in
prohibiting assisted suicide, he found that, at least in the case of
competent, terminally ill adults, those interests do not have the
compelling force that they must have in order to trump a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 54 Presciently, Judge Reinhardt concluded his opinion with the following envoi:
There is one final point we must emphasize. Some argue
strongly that decisions regarding matters affecting life or
death should not be made by the courts. Essentially, we
agree with that proposition. In this case, by permitting the
individual to exercise the right to choose we are following
the constitutional mandate to take such decisions out of
the hands of the government, both state and federal, and
to put them where they rightly belong, in the hands of the
people. We are allowing individuals to make the decisions
that so profoundly affect their very existence-and precluding the state from intruding excessively into that criti49.

50.
51.
1996).
52.
53.
54.

See id. at 593-94.

See id. at 594.
See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir.
Id. at 812.
Id. at 816.
See id. at 837.
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cal realm. The Constitution and the courts stand as a
bulwark between individual freedom and arbitrary and
intrusive governmental power. Under our constitutional
system, neither the state nor the majority of the people in a
state can impose its will upon the individual in a matter so
highly "central to personal dignity and autonomy." Those
who believe strongly that death must come without physician assistance are free to follow that creed, be they doctors
or patients. They are not free, however, to force their
views, their religious convictions, or their philosophies on
all the other members of a democratic society, and to compel those whose values differ with theirs to die painful, protracted, and agonizing deaths."
There are two features of these final words from Judge Reinhardt that deserve comment here. First, in Compassion in Dying,
the federal judiciary was asked to decide whether a restrictive
(indeed prohibitive) assisted suicide regime must, as a matter of
constitutional law, give way to a permissive one. In the passage
just quoted Judge Reinhardt makes it look as if he is neutral
between the two, allowing both regimes to flourish depending
upon the beliefs of the individuals involved in a particular case.
Furthermore, he makes this apparent neutrality appear to be
required of him by the Constitution. In reality, of course, Judge
Reinhardt was not at all neutral between restrictiveness and permissiveness. He was really saying that the Constitution requires
Washington to adopt a permissive regime, and the only way he
was able to make that claim was by giving the "ordered liberty"
component of substantive due process analysis as expansive a
reading as the mystery passage in Casey appeared to allow. Second, Judge Reinhardt ends his opinion with a reference to the
"painful, protracted, and agonizing deaths" that a restrictive
assisted suicide regime allegedly imposes on some individuals.
He makes it look as if opponents of assisted suicide are indifferent to those deaths. In reality, of course, no decent person is
indifferent to the pain and agony of others. Opponents of
assisted suicide are free to be vigorous advocates of aggressive
palliative care for the terminally ill, as most of them are. Opponents of assisted suicide also worry about the kinds of death that
some individuals may endure under a permissive assisted suicide
regime.5 6 Perhaps for every protracted death that a restrictive
55. Id. at 839.
56. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Future of Euthanasia and PhysicianAssisted Suicide: Beyond Rights Talk to Informed Public Policy, 82 MINN. L. REv. 983
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regime produces there would be several more miserable ends-oflife under a permissive regime. Whether or not this is true is a
significant aspect of the assisted suicide debate now being conducted in the legislatures of several states. For Judge Reinhardt
to make it look otherwise is either to be disingenuous in the
extreme or to be guilty of a flagrant ignoratioelenchi.
Meanwhile, and a continent away, another case was making
its way through the toils of the judicial process. In that case Doctor Timothy Quill, a physician known for his role in assisting one
of his patients to die, and two other doctors and their patients
had gone to federal court in New York seeking to have that
state's criminalization of assisting in a suicide declared unconstitutional. After failing in the district court, they succeeded in the
Second Circuit.5 7 That court, prompted by the hostility to
expansive substantive due process adjudication that the Supreme
Court had exhibited in Bowers v. Hardwick,"8 rejected the substantive due process rationale used by the Ninth Circuit in the case
just described,5 9 relying instead on a equal protection rationale.6 ° Whai the Second Circuit did was to divide terminally ill
New Yorkers into two cohorts: one cohort was composed of all
those terminally ill New Yorkers who depend for their continued
existence upon life-support systems of one sort or another; the
other cohort was composed of terminally ill New Yorkers who are
not so dependent. Of the first cohort one can say that under
state and federal law they can end their life at any time simply by
ordering the removal of the life-support system in question.6 1 Of
the second cohort one can say that they do not have similar
access to death.6 2 If, however, the Second Circuit reasoned,
those terminally ill New Yorkers in the second cohort could have
lethal doses of medication prescribed for them, then they would
be roughly equal to those of their fellow citizens who are in the
first cohort.6" The Second Circuit, after trashing the distinction
between killing and letting die, found there to be no rational
relationship between the inequality just noted and a legitimate
state interest. 64 For that reason, the Second Circuit found New
York's statutes that criminalize assisting in a suicide to be uncon57. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
58. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See supra text at notes 15-18 for a discussion on
this matter.
59. See Vacco, 80 F.3d at 724.
60. See id. at 725-731.
61. See id. at 727-729.
62. See id at 729.
63. See id. at 729-731.
64. See id.

382

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 12

stitutional at least insofar as it kept physicians from prescribing
lethal doses of medication to competent, terminally ill persons in
the final stages of their illness.6"
In the fall of 1996, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
both Glucksberg6 6 and Quill,67 and in June of 1997 it reversed both
decisions. To Quill the Court gave the back of its hand.6" It
found the distinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing
life-sustaining treatment to be eminently rational and deeply
rooted in the American legal system. 69 The Court also took the
attending physician's intent in the two scenarios seriously 7° and
upheld New York's laws that keep physicians from prescribing
medication when they know that the medication will be used by
the patient to bring about his or her death.7 1 It was, however,
the Supreme Court's decision in Glucksberg72 that was the more
important of the two, and it is to that case that I now turn.
All nine of the Justices who participated in Glucksberg concurred in the result: viz., that laws prohibiting assistance in suicides are not facially unconstitutional, at least insofar as those
laws are relevantly similar to the prohibitions embodied in the
laws of New York and Washington.73 Speaking for a majority,
ChiefJustice Rehnquist used Glucksbergas an occasion for reining
in the substantive use of the Due Process Clauses that the Ninth
Circuit had read so expansively. He did this by elevating the relatively objective and decidedly conservative "tradition" test of a
claim to substantive due process protection over a more subjective and expansive "ordered liberty" test.74 How the ChiefJustice
did this merits both a bit of explanation and a bit of evaluation.
With respect to the explanation, scholars of the common law
have realized for some time that the level of abstraction at which
a line of cases is considered is often crucial to the outcome of a
65. See id.
66. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 518 U.S. 1057 (1996).
67. See Vacco v. Quill, 518 U.S. 1055 (1996).
68. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2283 (1997).
69. See id. at 2298.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 2302.
72. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
73. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justice
O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
joined in part. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer all filed opinions
concurring in the judgment.
74. See id. at 2262-2268.
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particular case.7 5 Generally speaking, the more abstractly a line
of cases is considered, the freer the court in question is to make
new law under the guise of merely taking the next step in a wellestablished tradition. Conversely, the more concretely that line
is considered, the more constrained the court in question is
likely to be with respect to making new law. Much the same is
true of constitutional adjudication. In Bowers, for example, Justice White was doggedly concrete in his assessment of the Griswold/Roe line of cases, finding the case for a step from the
constitutional protection of family, marriage, and procreation to
a similar protection for homosexual sex deficient.7 6 In Casey, on
the other hand, the majority took the Roe line to (and perhaps
beyond) the highest possible level of abstraction in its effort to
root the constitutional protection of abortion in "the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."77 In Glucksberg, the
Chief Justice, speaking for the majority, insisted upon a concrete
consideration of the Roe line, requiring a "careful description"7 8
of the alleged fundamental right at stake in the case and a close
conceptual nexus between it and the allegedly analogous rights
that have already been given constitutional protection against
intrusive state legislation. 9
When we ask on what basis the Chief Justice chose between
the generous reading of prior cases illustrated by Casey and the
parsimonious reading illustrated by Hardwick, the Chief Justice
himself is quite forthcoming. "This approach," he says, referring
to the use of concrete examples (as opposed to a more abstract
"philosophic exercise") to determine "the outlines of the 'liberty'
specially protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, tends to rein
in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due-process judicial review."8" But a concrete approach to the "ordered
liberty" component of substantive due process adjudication inevitably leads to its subordination to the vastly more conservative
"tradition" component of it. That became evident in Hardwick,
and it became evident again in Glucksberg, where once the Chief
Justice had reported that for the past seven hundred years "our
75. SeeJulius Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 22 MOD. L. REv. 597
(1959). This article and the literature of which it is critical is discussed in
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).
76.
77.

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).

78.

Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,

302 (1993)).
79.
80.

See id. at 2268-70.
Id. at 2268.
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laws have consistently condemned... assisted suicide,"'" the case
for a constitutional right to assistance in suicide was doomed. At
least in the hands of the ChiefJustice, then, a concrete approach
to "ordered liberty" analysis denies any independent generative
capacity to it, and it is precisely that effect that the Chief Justice
was out to achieve.
High school students used to learn that they have to realize
that Shakespeare's Julius Caesar isn't really about Julius Caesar
before they can begin to understand the play. Similarly readers
of the assisted suicide cases must realize that they aren't really
about assisted suicide before they can begin to understand them.
Just asJulius Caesar provides the occasion for a study of Brutus in
Shakespeare's play, so assisted suicide provides an occasion for a
study of the role of the federal judiciary in American political life
in Glucksberg and, to a lesser extent, in Quill. In Glucksberg the
Chief Justice was able to put together a substantial majority in
opposition to the federal judiciary's playing a leadership role in
the contemporary debate over how we die. Several of the concurring opinions make it clear, however, that in rejecting a role
of that sort, the Court was by no means withdrawing completely
from the fray. Were state legislatures to pass laws that threatened
with punishment those doctors who prescribe aggressive palliative care for their dying patients, the federal courts, the concurring opinions suggest, would surely step in to invalidate those
laws. 82 No one seriously expects laws of that sort to be passedthe legislative trend is in just the opposite direction-but the
concurring opinions conjure them up, I suspect, to remind us
that the federal courts stand ready to vindicate the fundamental
rights of the people from inappropriate legislative restrictions
upon them. A proper evaluation of Glucksberg must focus on the
appropriateness, or not, of the federal courts' playing just this
role with respect to the protection of those unenumerated rights
for which constitutional protection is sought by way of the Due
Process Clause.
To my mind, the best point of departure with respect to an
evaluation of the role that Glucksbergassigns to the federal judiciary is by looking at our state legislatures, asking if with respect to
assisted suicide they are likely to suffer from just those infirmities
that for the past sixty years the federal courts have used as justifications for strict scrutiny of their legislative product. At first
81.
Id. at 2267.
82. See id. at 2308-2310 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments of
Glucksbergand Quill); id. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments of
Glucksberg and Quill).
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glance, surely, that does not appear to be the case. Unlike
Catholics in Oregon in the twenties,"3 or African-Americans in
the South in the fifties,84 those of us who are likely to die a medicalized death do not lack legislative clout, and no special interest
group is waiting to thwart our legislative efforts. In a representative democracy such as we have in the United States, courts
should engage in constitutional invalidation of the laws that our
representatives make only when those laws offend some express
or implied constitutional value, as the case law has illuminated
the text of the Constitution, or when there's good reason to suspect that certain legislation is imposing the tyranny of the majority in a way that denies the equal protection of the laws to a
group especially in need of that protection, or when a legislature
has pathologically encroached upon some extra-constitutional
value in a way that we simply cannot defend or abide. Nos morituri just aren't that sort of a group and the prohibition upon
lethal prescriptions just isn't that sort of encroachment.
To make of our existential angst over how we will die a fundamental right would be to disable our legislatures with respect
to a set of questions regarding which they are at least as capable
of producing good answers as our courts are. In the end, therefore, Glucksberg should be seen as moving us towards the resolution of the crisis in which we found ourselves as the case went up
to the Supreme Court. The expansion of substantive due process
jurisprudence to every intimate, personal issue has been prevented, and the great questions regarding how dying should be
constructed so that we can realize its full human potential has
been left to legislative resolution, at least in the first instance.
When a particular legislature's resolution of those questions
becomes the subject of litigation regarding its constitutionality,
the judiciary should proceed with caution, conscious of the limitations upon its authority that the Constitution imposes and of
the limitations upon its wisdom that the human condition
imposes. That it will do so is, however, open to question. The
same Supreme Court that endorsed a restrained approach to
substantive due process in Glucksberg appears to have retreated
from that endorsement in a recent decision.8 5 It is, therefore, all
the more necessary for the friends of representative democracy
to become articulate once again in the language of judicial

83.
84.
85.

See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998).
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restraint. Only when that restraint is observed are the people
truly free to govern themselves with respect to the life and death
issues to which the articles that follow this foreword are
addressed.

